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EQUAL PROTECTION THEORY AND THE
• HARVEY MILK HIGH SCHOOL: WHY
ANTI-SUBORDINATION ALONE IS
NOT ENOUGH
Abstract: In recent years, advocates for youth have begun to support
voluntary school segregation as a solution to the problem of inequality in
public schools. These advocates are less concerned with different treatment
on the basis of classifications like race or sex than with the disadvantages
resulting from such classifications. They believe that this approach to
inequality, called anti-subordination, provides a better way to achieve
equality than does formal equality; the method of treating everyone alike.
The introduction of the Harvey Milk High School in New York City, the
nation's first, public school established to meet the needs of lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, and questioning students and others in crisis,
provides a fresh opportunity to examine this equal protection debate. This
Note will argue that anti-subordination must be reunited with formal
equality through comprehensive programs in integrated schools in order to
provide true equal protection for all students.
INTRODUCTION
Segregated public education may appear to be an institution
American society abolished as it overcame its discriminatory past) Yet
the practice of segregating children in public schools not only survives
America's past; in certain contexts, it is gaining momentum, 2 This
practice, however, is significantly more complicated than it seems, 3
Some advocates argue that, when voluntary, segregation is an impor-
tant step forward towards achieving equality in public education. 4
Kristen J. Cerven, Note, Single-Sex Education: Promoting Equality or an Unconstitutional
Divide?, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 699.
2 Id.
s Sec Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 478 (1976); W.E.B. DuBois, Does the Negro Need
Separate Schools?, 4 J. OF NEGRO EDUC, 328, 335 (1935); Amy H. Nemko, Single-Sex Public
Education After V1111: The Case for Women's Schools, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 76-77 (1998);
Pamela J. Smith, All-Male Black Schools and the Equal Protection Clause: A Step Forward Toward
Education, 66 TuL. L. REV. 2003, 2014-15 (1992).
4 DuBois, supra note 3, at 333-35; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Nemko, supra note
3, at 76-77; Smith, supra note 3, at 2014-15.
869
870	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 45:869
After decades of fighting for integration and watching racial de-
segregation efforts falter, attitudes toward equality in public schools
have begun to change in recent years.° Some advocates argue that the
formal equal treatment sought in integration cases can be an empty
ideal rather than the key to equality.° These advocates are less con-
cerned with different treatment on the basis of classifications like race
or sex than with the disadvantages resulting from such classifications.?
Their approach focuses on repairing the negative impact discrimina-
tion has on members of disadvantaged groups.° Advocates believe that
this method, called anti-subordination, provides a better way to
achieve equality than does formal equality, the method of treating
everyone alike.°
The anti-subordination movement contends that it is perfectly
acceptable, even desirable, to treat children differently on the basis of
their group membership if it will help them overcome the special ob-
stacles they face."' Discrimination on the basis of group classifications
is therefore positive if it serves the ultimate purpose of achieving
equality.n Anti-subordination and formal equality advocates thus in-
terpret the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of equal protection, which is
rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment, from distinct perspectives. 12
The anti-subordination movement has sought voluntary segregation
as a solution to a public school system that is failing its female and
minority students, preferring to target the immediate educational
needs of these children rather than insist on integrated education—
an ideal that has not lived up to its promise."
Voluntary school segregation has become increasingly popular
over the last decade, particularly with regard to single-sex schools."
5 Sec Bell, supra note 3, at 488; Nemko, supra note 3, at 76-77; Smith, supra note 3, at
2014-15.
6 Bell, supra note 3, at 478; DuBois, supra note 3, at 335; Nemko, supra note 3, at 32-33.
7
 Nemko, supra note 3, at 31; secRuth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and
Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1005-08 (1986); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of Our
Constitution /1 Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1991),
8
 Nemko, supra note 3, at 31; see Gotanda, supra note 7, at 2.
9 Nemko, supra note 3, at 31-34, 76-77; see Colker, supra note 7, at 1007, 1066; Smith,
supra note 3, at 2015. Ruth Colker uses the term "anti-differentiation" to describe formal
equality. Colker, supra note 7, at 1005.
10 See Gotanda, supra note 7, at 2; Nemko, supra note 3, at 59-61; Smith, supra note 3,
at 2048.
11 See Colker, supra note 7, at 1008-10.
12 U.S. CoNs .r. amend. XIV, § 1; see Nemko, supra note 3, at 21.
IS Nemko, supra note 3, at 76-77: see Bell, supra note 3, at 478; Smith, supra note 3, at
2014-15.
14 See Cerven, supra note 1, at 699.
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Although some single-sex schools have existed for years; a new crop
has appeared across the United States from New York to California. 15
These schools are based on several different models. 16 There are, for
example, single-sex schools that are targeted at empowering young
women; school districts have experimented with paired single-sex
academies that educate boys and girls separately as well." Advocates
have also pushed for all-male black schools, although this idea has
appeared to be too controversial to sustain support. la
The Harvey Milk High School ("HMHS") in New York City, the
first public school designed to meet the needs of lesbian, gay, bisex-
ual, transgender, and questioning ("LGBTQ") students, adds a new
dimension to this trend. 19 HMHS has existed since 1985 as a special
program for LGBTQ students. 20 The program operates as a partner-
ship between the New York City Department of Education and the
Hetrick-Martin Institute, a nonprofit organization dedicated to advo-
cating for and supporting LGBTQ youths. 21 Originally a small off-site
15 Id. at 699, 717, 722, 723.
16 Sec id. at 717, 722 (comparing Young Women's Leadership School in Harlem and
Young Women's Leadership Charter School in Chicago with paired single-gender acade-
mies in California, which have not been assuccessful).
17 Id, at 717, 722, 723-24.
la See Garrett v. Bd. of. Educ., 775 F. Stipp. 1004, 1014 (E.D. Mich. 1991). In 1991, in
Garrett v. Board of Education, the Eastern District of Michigan found in favor of the plaintiffs
to defeat a proposal for all-male black schools in Detroit on the basis of sex discrimination.
Id. The schools, although targeted to black boys, did not limit admission on the basis of
race. Sec id. Yet the court's subtle acknowledgement of the race issue indicates the policy
problem inherent in segregation of this kind even if it were constitutional as to sex. See
Richard Cummings, All-Male Black Schools...Equal Protection, the New Separatism and Brown v,
Board Of Education, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q., 725, 754 (1993); see also Helaine Greenfeld,
Note, Some Constitutional Problems with the Resegregation of Public Schools, 80 GEO. Li. 363, 370
(1991). It must be noted, however, that these urban schools were already de facto segre-
gated; there would have been no affirmative need to exclude white children in order to
achieve a black student body. Sec Smith, supra note 3, at 2009-11.
The terms "black" and "white" are used throughout this Note because they are the
most inclusive terms for people who may share skin color, but not necessarily a common
ancestry or culture. See Rachel L. Swarns, African-Antelican' Becomes a Term for Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, at 1 (using the term "black* in describing the cultural debate over
terminology).
19 See Catherine Gewertz, Expansion of N.Y.C. School Ignites Debate over Gay Students' Needs,
EDucArioN WEEK, Sept. 3, 2003, at 7. The Hetrick-Martin Institute (-limn, a nonprofit
organization that helps to run HMHS, uses the inclusive term LGBTQ. See HMI, About HMI
& HMHS, at lutp://www.hmi.org/GeneralInfoAndDonations/AboutHMIAndHMHS/de-
fault.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2004) [hereinafter HMI, About MR CI' HAWS].
2° Gewertz, supra note 19, at 7; sec HMI, About HMI & HAWS, supra note 19.
21 Sec Gewertz, supra note 19, at 7; HMI, About HMI & IIMH.S. supra note 19.
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program, HMHS is now a full-fledged, four-year institution. 22 HMHS
does not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in admissions;
rather, it is open to all applicants and aims to admit students who have
been the victims of verbal or physical abuse.23
HMHS is a creative response to the unique problems .
 LGBTQ
youths face in public schools." Recent studies reflect that 69% of
LGBTQ students reported experiencing harassment or violence at
schoo1. 28
 A wealth of statistics demonstrates the extent of the dis-
crimination these students face. 26
 Over 40% of these students do not
feel safe at their schools. 27
 Ultimately, 28% of LGBTQ students drop
out of school altogether. 28
 In seeking to eliminate these problems,
HMHS provides a fresh opportunity to examine voluntary school seg-
regadon through the lens of the anti-subordination versus formal
equality debate underscoring ii. 29
Part I of this Note introduces the philosophical debate between
anti-subordination and formal equality." It then presents arguments
for and against voluntary school segregation based on these compet-
ing theories." Part II examines the relevant equal protection jurispru-
dence with a focus on U.S. Supreme Court cases. 32
 This Part describes
the landmark cases on segregated public education, as well as an im-
portant case on segregation in the military." It also explains scrutiny
considerations relevant to evaluating an equal protection problem."
22
 Donna I. Dennis & Ruth E. Harlow, Gay Youth and the Right to Education, 4 VALE L. 8.:
POL'v REv. 446, 454 n.36 {1986); HMI, Q As on HAWS, at littp://www.hini.org/
GeneralInfoAndDonations/QAndAsonHMHS/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter HMI, Q &A's on 111111151.
23 See HMI, Q &A's on HMHS, supra note 22.
24
 See Dennis & Harlow, supra note 22, at 454.
26
 HMI, LGBTQ Youth Statistics, at lutp://www.h mi.org/Commun
 ity/LGBTQlbuthStatis-
tics/defaultaspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2004) [hereinafter HMI, LGBTQMuth Statistics]. HMI
obtains its information from the Sexual Information and Education Council of the United
States and from the National Mental Health Association. Id. More information is available at
http://wsmsiecus.org
 and http://www. nmha.org, respectively.
26 HMI, LGBTQ Youth Statistics, supra note 25. For example, 46% of LGBTQ students
reported verbal harassment, 36.4% reported sexual harassment, 12.1% reported physical
harassment, and 6.1% reported physical assault. Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See Gewertz, supra note 19, at 7.
3° Sec infra notes 41-79 and accompanying text.
31
 See infra notes 80-126 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 127-215 and accompanying text.
33
	 infra notes 134-190 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 191-215 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Part III analyzes HMHS and concludes that the school is
constitutional." It argues, however, that voluntary school segregation
is detrimental because it prioritizes anti-subordination over formal
equality in the dangerous context of segregation." This approach
sends society the message that hostility justifies segregation, and has
negative concrete effects, such as allowing discrimination in inte-
grated schools to continue, entrenching classifications, and creating
stigma.57 Fighting discrimination within integrated schools is a better
approach because it reunites anti-subordination and formal equality
by addressing real student needs, while insisting on integrated educa-
tion." Reuniting these theories provides the best chance that LGBTQ
students will receive equal protection in public education in the long
run.59 It. also provides the best Chance to become a society in which
being a member of a particular classification is irrelevant for equal
protection purposes.°
I. ANTI-SUBORDINATION V. FORMAL EQUALITY
A, The Debate Behind the Debate: Protecting Disadvantaged Individuals
Versus Treating Everyone Alike
The debate between anti-subordination and formal equality is, at
its heart, a debate over the central meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 41 The Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment' provides that "[njo State shall ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."42 This simple phrase has been the subject of intense delibera-
tion throughout equal protection jurisprudence.° The Equal Protec-
tion Clause encompasses at least two potentially conflicting ideals—
treating people alike and providing equal protection to disadvantaged
individuals. 44 Courts have prioritized one goal over the other at differ-
83 See infra notes 217-249 and accompanying text.
36 Sec infra notes 250-274 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 275-321 and accompanying text.
38 Sec infra notes 322-347 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 322-347 and accompanying text.
4° See infra notes 322-347 and accompanying text.
41 See Nemko, supra note 3, at 21.
42 U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1.
43 See Nemko, supra note 3, at 31; see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson. "Unexplainable on
Grounds Other Than Race": The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection juris-
prudence, 2003 U. ILL L. ki:v. 615,616.
44 See Hutchinson, supra note 43, at 619-24; Neinko, supra note 3, at 21.
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ent times, sometimes enforcing formally neutral rules and sometimes
allowing classification-specific means of overcoming obstacles, such as
affirmative action. 45
 The dominant approach in the law today requires
formal equality as the default rule, permitting classification-specific
approaches to equal protection problems in narrow circunmtances. 46
Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently articulated
that equal protection problems must be dealt with in terms of suspect.
classifications, not classes. 47
 The Court has shifted the relevant inquiry
from classes to classifications over the last couple of decades. 48
 For
example, whereas the Court once referred to blacks as a suspect class,
it now refers to race as a suspect classification.49
 Thus, by emphasizing
the classification itself rather than whether a person is advantaged or
disadvantaged within it, the Court has moved further in the direction
of supporting formal equality. 50
Anti-subordination advocates, however, argue that anti-subordina-
don, rather than formal equality, was the true goal of the Fourteenth
Amendment.5 i Congress originally adopted the Fourteenth Amend-
ment after the Civil War to remedy the effects of black slavery, an
original intent which the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized.52 In
light of this goal, anti-subordination theorists find that the formal
45 Sec Nemko, supra note 3, at 21 (describing different approaches to gender equality).
The U.S. Supreme Court has taken analogous approaches to racial equality. Compare Gnu-
ter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,343-44 (2003) (permitting affirmative action for reasons of
diversity in law school admissions), with Adarand Constructors, Inc. V. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
227 (1995) (prohibiting affirmative action plan in employment).
45
 Sec Nemko, supra note 3, at 28-29 (discussing gender). Compare Grittier, 539 U.S. at
343-44 (permitting the consideration of race as one factor in an individualized assessment
in law school admissions), with Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,253-57 (2003) (prohibiting
a university admissions system awarding extra points on the basis of race). But see Calker,
supra note 7, at 1011 (arguing that anti-differentiation, or formal equality, better explains
the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to equal protection problems). For a detailed history
of these two approaches, as well as an insightful analysis of their relationship to each other,
see also Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Consti-
tutional Struggles over Brown, 117 41ARv. L. Rev. 1470,1474-75 (2004).
47 See Grittier; 539 U.S. at 326; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 216-17 (using classifications with re-
spect to race); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,197-98 (1976) (using classifications
with respect to gender).
48
 Hutchinson,  supra note 43, at 638-40. Compare Gruttm; 539 U.S. at 326, and Adarand,
515 U.S. at 216-17 (using classifications), with San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1,17 (1973) (using classes).
49 Grn tier, 539 U.S. at 326; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 216-17; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17.
5° See Grittier, 539 U.S. at 326; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 216-17; Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-98.
51 Nemko, supra note 3, at 31.
52
 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,71 (1872); Nemko, supra note 3,
at 31-32. The idea of overcoming discrimination to achieve equality has expanded over
time to include other groups, such as women. Sec Nemko, supra note 3, at 34-35.
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equality approach to equal protection, which insists on color (or other
classification) blindness, is essentially empty absent historical context."
The archetypical example of formal equality analysis is the 1896
case, Plessy u Ferguson, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that
separate but equal accommodations in railroad cars for blacks and
whites were constitutional." The Court. held that the treatment both
races received was equal because it was parallel: whites were prohibited
from using black accommodations, just as blacks were prohibited from
using white accomiiiodations.55 The Court stated that any "badge of
inferiority" perceived in this distinction was a construction imposed by
blacks.56 This analysis excludes historical and social context, maintain-
ing that equality on its face is all that equal protection requires. 57
In his dissenting opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan articu-
lated his belief that the majority's opinion in Plessy was a fallacy, writ-
ing that "[e]very one knows that the statute in question had its origin
in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad
cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches
occupied by or assigned to white persons."" This point is clear from
the language of the statute itself, which provided that "'nothing in
this act shall be construed as applying to nurses attending children of
the other race'"; it is difficult to imagine that there were any white
nurses attending black children in 1896. 56 From the perspective of
anti-subordination, the central goal of equal protection may be lost.
without this larger understanding of what equality means ill a par-
ticular case, as it was in Plessy, a decision that ignored the racist. un-
derpinnings of the problem at stake. 66
A modern example of formal equality analysis arises in the con
text of affirmative action.61 Some formal equality advocates maintain
that affirmative action for racial minorities, which allows for different
treatment based on racial classifications, violates formal equality and
ss Nemko, supra note 3, at 32-33.
54 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896); sec Nemko, supra note 3, at 32.
55 Sec Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540-41, 550-51; Gotanda, supra note 7, at 38.
56 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
57 Gotanda, supra note 7, at 38; Nemko, supra note 3, at 32-33; sec Plessy, 163 U.S. at
551-52.
58 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Marian, J., dissenting).
58 See id. at 540-41 (quoting 1890 La. Acts 152, No. 111, § 3).
50 Gotanda, supra note 7, at 38; Nemko, supra note 3, at 32-33; see 163 U.S. at 550-52.
Gotanda, supra note 7, at 41-42; Nemko, supra note 3, at 33-34.
876	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 45:869
thus equal protection—for whites. 62 In Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia v. Bakke, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. explained this position suc-
cinctly when he stated that "equal protection cannot mean one thing
when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a
person of another color."66
 Anti-subordination theorists believe that
equating discrimination against whites in the context of affirmative
action with the historical discrimination against minorities is equiva-
lent to ignoring the past—that color blindness is blind." The most
important question from an anti-subordination perspective is whether
the classification at issue in an equal protection problem exists for
exclusionary or inclusionary reasons.° The classification itself is the
beginning, not the end, of the analysis. 66
Additionally, anti-subordination advocates contend that formal
equality does not merely disregard important social context; rather, it
actually legitimates discrimination.° From this perspective, the exis-
tence of formal rules for dealing with discrimination creates a barrier
to achieving real equality because the law will be applied to the disad-
vantage of oppressed groups. 68
 For example, it can be argued that the
body of equal protection case law produced since the 1950s has nar-
rowed the doctrine such that it has become even more difficult to
bring a cause of action than it was before these cases were decided.°
In this view, formal equality is not merely ineffectual: it is detrimental
for members of disadvantaged classifications. 70
Some formal equality theorists, however, focus on the long-term
implications of using classifications as a basis for different treatment,
Hutchinson, supra note 43, at 640-43 (discussing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978)); sec Nemko, supra note 3, at 33-34.
63 438 U.S. at 289-90; see Hutchinson, supra note 43, at 642.
Nemko, supra note 3, at 33.
66
 See id. at 35.
66
 See id.; see also Denise C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis After United States v.
Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. Cm. LEGAL
F. 381, 437-40 (discussing the asymmetrical nature of the anti-subordination principal
explained in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996) ( 17M/)).
67
 Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV, 1049, 1049-50 (1978);
Gotanda, supra note 7, at 2-3.
68 Freeman, supra note 67, at 1049-50.
a° Id. Alan David Freeman provides an illustration of this principle through a fictional
dialogue between "The Law" and "Black Americans" at the beginning of his article. Id.
This viewpoint is largely associated with the Critical Legal Studies and Critical Race Theory
schools of thought. See, e.g., id. at 1049; Gotanda, supra note 7, at 62 nn.252 & 254.
70 Freeman, supra note 67, at 1049-50; Gotanda, supra note 7, at 2-3.
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rather than the result in a particular case. 71 From this perspective, the
advantage of formal equality is that it prevents society from entrench-
ing classifications and thus allowing them to become more important
than they should be, or allowing them to be misused. 72 Advocates note
that the demand for formal equality has grown out of the history of
invidious misuse of classifications; therefore, society must be careful
in invoking them. 75 Furthermore, invoking classifications at all may be
inherently dangerous because it obscures the way in which the power-
ful dominate the powerless. 74 When society views the world according
to classifications, society legitimates treating members of those
classifications differently. 75 Those classifications thus are en-
trenched—they become normal and function as an excuse to treat.
members of different classifications disparately. 76
By insisting on formal equality, advocates hope to encourage so-
cial change over time and work towards becoming a society in which
classifications would no longer be grounds for treating people differ-
ently. 77 This approach seeks to protect the powerless from continued
discrimination that could result from viewing the world in black and
white—or female and male, or LGBTQ and heterosexual. 78 Thus, the
debate becomes which methodanti-subordination or formal equal-
ity—better advances the interests of members of disadvantaged
classifications, as well as the interests of society as a whole. 79
71 See Valorie K. Vodjik, Girls' Schools After VW: Do They Make the Grade?, 4 DUKE], GEN-
DER L. & NCI( 69,70-71,83-84 (1997).
" See id. at 70-71.
73 Sec Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361-62 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (discussing race); see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,283 (1979) ( Justice William Bren-
nan's opinion for the Court, discussing gender); Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71; Carrie
Corcoran, Comment, Single-Sex Education After VMI: Equal Protection and East Harlem's }bung.
Women's Leadership School, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 987,1030 (1997).
74 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 8-9 (1987).
75 Id.
76 Id. Catharine A. MacKinnon articulates this principle powerfully, stating that
ifference is the velvet glove on the iron fist of domination." Id. at 8.
" See Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71.
7E1 SCC MACKINNON, supra note 74, at 8-9; Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71.
79 Compare Nemko, supra note 3, at 76-77 (advancing anti-subordination in single-sex
schools), with Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71 (advancing formal equality in single-sex
schools).
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B. The Argument for Anti-Subordination in Public Education:
Short-Term Student Needs Matter Most
In the context of public education, anti-subordination advocates
argue that treating members of disadvantaged classifications differ-
ently may be necessary to achieve equality of educational opportu-
nity.80
 These advocates support an idea articulated by black activist.
and intellectual W.E.B. DuBois: children need education, not inte-
grated education or segregated education. 81
 These advocates main-
tain that a fear of classifications must become secondary to a desire to
meet each child's immediate educational needs, and therefore society
should choose voluntary segregation over formal equality. 82
Anti-subordination advocates argue that public school teachers
may be biased against members of certain disadvantaged
classifications, such as girls or black boys. 85
 Alternatively, these teach-
ers may simply lack the skills to deal with the specific issues these chil-
dren face. 84
 As a result, these children suffer disparate treatment, in-
cluding a lack of attention and lower academic expectations for girls
and increased levels of punishment and special or remedial education
tracking for black boys.85
 Children also may face obstacles that other
students create; for example, girls experience sexual harassment as
early as junior high schoo1.86
 Treatment from teachers, students, or
both may result in lower levels of personal confidence. 87
88
 See Morgan, supra note 66, at 458-60; Nemko, supm note 3, at 76-77; Smith, supra
note 3, at 2054-55.
81 DuBois, supra note 3, at 335; see Morgan, supra note 66, at 458 n.309 (emphasizing
the distinction drawn by DuBois between voluntary and compulsory segregation).
'4 See DuBois, supra note 3, at 330-31; Morgan, supra note 66, at 458-60; Nemko, supra
note 3, at 76-77.
83
 For a discussion of girls in public schools, see AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. WomEN, How
SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE Gutt„s: A SlIIDY OF MAJOR FINDINGS ON GIRLS AND EDUCATION 68
(1992) [hereinafter AAUW REPORT], and Elizabeth Fennema et al., Teachers' Attributions and
Beliefs About Girls, Boys, and Mathematics, 21 EDUC. STUD. IN MATHEMATICS 55, 62, 66-67
(1990), cited in Nemko, supra note 3, at 55-56. For a discussion of black boys in public
schools, see Smith, supra note 3, at 2041-42.
84
 See Smith, supra note 3, at 2041-42.
88
 For a discussion of girls in public schools, see AAUW REPORT, supra note 83, at 68-
71, and Fennema et al., supra note 83, at 62,66, cited in Nemko, supra note 3, at 55-56. For
a discussion of black boys in public schools, see Smith, supra note 3, at 2041-43.
AAUW REPORT, supra note 83, at 73, cited in Nemko, supra note 3, at 56-57.
87
 AAUW REPORT, supra note 83, at 11, cited in Nemko, supra note 3, at 56-58; Smith,
supra note 3, at 2048-49.
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The problems that members of these classifications face may even
be institudonal, 88 The scarcity of information in public education
about black achievements, for instance, may prevent black children
from obtaining a full sense of self-worth. 89 This problem extends be-
yond one teacher or set of students to the entire educational system. 99
Children who, as a result of their group membership, experience dis-
advantages with respect to teachers, other students, and the educa-
tional system as a whole may be less successful academically."
Anti-subordination advocates argue that voluntary school segre-
gation can be an effective toot for remedying the problems these
children encounter.92 For example, girls in single-sex schools have an
opportunity to learn in an environment that challenges traditional
sex roles.° Similarly, black youths in black schools have a chance to
learn in an environment free from racism." Students who have had a
chance to take advantage of these opportunities have demonstrated,
according to some research, increased academic achievement.. 95 From
an and-subordination perspective, voluntary school segregation thus
functions as a form of affirmative action for children who have been
disadvantaged in past educational experiences. 96 It provides a com-
pensatory function—an opportunity for these students to reach a
level of achievement that they would have reached absent societal dis-
crimination or disadvantage, 97
Anti-subordination advocates address some of the criticisms of
voluntarily segregated schools by emphasizing the positive experi-
88 John A. Powell, Black Immersion Schools, 21 NA U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 669, 683
(1995); see Sntith, supra note 3, at 2048-49.
89 See Richard Thompson Ford, Brown 's Ghost, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1305, 1321 (2004);
Powell, sum note 88, at 681-82; Smith, supra note 3, at 2048-49.
99 Powell, supra note 88, at 683; Smith, supra note 3, at 2048-49; sec also Dennis & Har-
low, supra note 22, at 453 (describing the discrimination LGBTQ students face as an insti-
tutional problem).
91 For a discussion of girls in public schools, see AAUW REPORT, supra note 83, at 22-32,
and Susan Estrich, For Girls' Schools and Women's Colleges, Separate Is Better; NA'. Timm MAG.,
May 22, 1994, at 39, cited in Nemko, supra note 3, at 58. For a discussion of black boys in pub-
lic schools, see Powell, supra note 88, at 683, and Smith, supra note 3, at 2042-43.
92 See Nemko, supra note 3, at 59; Smith, supra note 3, at 2043.
93 Nemko, supra note 3. at 63.
94 Sec Smith, supra note 3, at 2048-49.
95 See Nemko, supra note 3, at 59-61; Smith, supra note 3, at 2048.
96 See VW, 518 U.S. at 533; Corcoran,' supra note 73, at 1021-29 (discussing gender);
see also Greenfelcl, supra note 18, at 374-78 (articulating and criticizing this argument in
the context of race).
See 17/111, 518 U.S. at 533; Corcoran, supra note 73, at 1021-29; Greenfeid, supra note
18, at 374-78.
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ences of students who attend them.98
 Rather than stigmatizing the
students who attend or reinforcing negative stereotypes, these schools
provide an opportunity for students to learn in a modern, alternative
environment that helps them fight stereotypes. 99
 The true stigma ex-
ists in the disparate treatment these children face at their integrated
public schools.m Furthermore, students elect to attend voluntarily
segregated schools.lill Unlike traditionally segregated schools, which
enforce a discriminatory state agenda, these schools simply provide an
opportunity and a choice . 102
 Ultimately, anti-subordination advocates
urge society to prioritize the real educational needs of real children
who face obstacles in public schools over any perceived abstract need
to treat them the same as everyone else. 103
C. The Argument for Formal Equality in Public Education:
Long-Term Societal Consequences Matter Most
Opponents of voluntarily segregated schools, in contrast, maintain
that any kind of segregation is inherently dangerous. 10" These advocates
argue that segregation encourages society to think in terms of
classifications, which will result in stereotyping despite good intentions
to the contrary. 195
 Segregation may also be inherently stigmatizing.'°6
Proponents of formal equality over anti-subordination believe that
separate but equal is always unequal, and public education has no place
for segregated schools, whether enrollment is voluntary or not.'"
Formal equality advocates argue that voluntary school segrega-
tion entrenches the classifications that serve as the root of the prob-
98 See Nemko, supra note 3, at 63; Smith, supra note 3, at 2050-51.
99 Sec Nemko, supra note 3, at 63; Smith, supra note 3, at 2050-51.
100 See DuBois, supra note 3, at 330-31.
101
 Nemko, supra note 3, at 63. Justice Clarence Thomas's concurring opinion, in 1995
in Missouri v. Jenkins, explains that only state-enforced segregation is harmful; if blacks only
could achieve a quality education through integration, then that would imply that blacks
are inferior. See 515 U.S. 70,118-23 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). The problem with
segregation is therefore not the separation itself, but the state enforcement. Sce id. (Tho-
mas, j., concurring),
102 Sec Nemko, supra note 3, at 63; Smith, supra note 3, at 2014-15.
103 Sec DuBois, supra note 3, at 335; Nemko, supra note 3, at 76-77; Smith, supra note 3,
at 2054-55. For a succinct, straightforward argument in favor of HMHS, see generally Re-
becca Bethard, Comment, New Voiles Harvey Milk School.. A Viable Alternative, 3311.. & Enuc.
417 (2004).
104
 Sec Cummings, supra note 18, at 725-26; Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71.
199 See Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71.
108 See Cummings, supra note 18, at 725-26.
107 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954); Cummings, supra note 18, at
725; Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71.
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lem)°8 In the United States, segregated schooling is rooted histori-
cally in discrimination• 09 Although voluntary segregation proposals
today may spring from an anti-subordination motive rather than an
oppressive one, the result is the separation of children according to
classifications."° The distinction between these motives may be lost
on society because the institutions look similar)" Most people will
see only that children belonging to disadvantaged classifications are
separated from other children, with stale approval. 112 Separation
based on classifications, therefore, may appear natural or normal." 5
Voluntary school segregation thus promotes dividing people accord-
ing to classifications, which may encourage society to view those
classifications as reasons to treat people differently. 114 In this way,
even the best-intentioned proposal for voluntary school segregation
may function as an invitation to discrimination. 110
Formal equality advocates also maintain that the practice of seg-
regation stigmatizes the children who are segregated, and they cite a
wealth of social science data in the context of state-mandated segrega-
tion as support." 6 According to this research, segregation unfairly
burdens members of segregated groups because they alone must ex-
perience the dissonance between the ideals of democracy and the re-
ality of state-mandated segregation. 117 Segregation is a particular
source of difficulty for those in the minority. 118 Segregated minorities
often experience disturbing feelings, such as a sense of inferiority, in-
ternal conflict. regarding self-worth, aggressiveness, martyrdom, sub-
08 See Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71,83-84.
100 See id. at 83-84 (discussing single-sex schools, which historically have been premised
on the belief that men and women had different educational needs); see also C mings,
supra note 18, at 725-26 (alluding to the racial segregation that Brown dismantled).
110 Sec Cummings, supra note 18, at 725-26; Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71,83-84,
111 Sec Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71,83-84.
" 2 See id.
Its See id.
"4 See id. at 70-71.
"5 See id.
"6 See Cummings, supra note 18, at 725-26,728-33. Richard Cummings cites, in par-
ticular, the work of social scientist Dr. Kenneth Clark on racial segregation, which the U.S.
Supreme Court used as support in Brown. Id. at 730-31; see 347 U.S. at 494 11.11. The valid-
ity of this research has been the subject of much controversy. GEOFFREY R. STONE 1T Al..,
CoNsTr•t•onm. LAW 450-51 (4th ed. 2001); see Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Multiple Myths and
Outcomes of Sex Segirgation, 14 NAT. Sett. J. HUM. •rs. 185,191 (1997) (questioning the
validity of social science data regarding single-sex education). But see Dennis & Harlow,
supra note 22, at 455 (suggesting that stigma would be problem of HMHS).
117 Cummings, supra note 18, at 730-31,
118 1d. at 730.
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missiveness, and a tendency to withdraw. 119 Segregation results in a
distorted perception of reality and perpetuates a vicious cycle in
which disparate treatment begets negative effects which serve as a ba-
sis for more disparate treatmen1. 120
 Furthermore, those in the major-
ity (that is not segregated) experience negative feelings ranging from
increased hostility to internal conflict."' Although the social science
data indicating these effects is specific to state-mandated segregation,
formal equality advocates believe it is unlikely that state-supported
segregation in the form of voluntary school segregation would pro-
duce significantly different results."2
Formal equality advocates insist that segregation is inherently in-
vidiotts. 123
 It shapes the way society views members of the segregated
classifications, and it shapes the way the members of those
classifications view thernselves. 124
 In a country that has spent years
fighting segregation on the premise that separate can never be equal,
any segregation, even voluntary segregation, is a defeat for equality. 125
From the perspective of formal equality advocates, voluntary segrega-
tion is tantamount to giving up on the possibility of achieving inte-
grated schools that provide equal educational opportunity for all
children. 126
II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
Analyzing the constitutionality of HMHS in the context of the
anti-subordination versus formal equality debate requires sifting
through fifty years of equal protection case law and applying it to !his
novel situation. 127
 The U.S. Supreme Court has made powerful state-
ments about state-mandated school segregation on the basis of race
and has recently addressed segregation on the basis of gender as
well. 128
 It is unclear, however, how this case law applies to voluntary
115 Id.
128 Id.
121 Id. at 731.
122 See Cummings, supra note 18, at 725-26.
in See id. at 730; Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71, 83-84.
124 See Cursunings, supra note 18, at 730; Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71.
126
 See Cummings, supra note 18, at 725.
126 Ford, supra note 89, at 1331-32; Vodjik, supra note 71, at 94.
127 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996) (1 7111/); Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
128 See I'm, 518 U.S. at 533-34; Cooper; 358 U.S. at 16; Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
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school segregation. 129 The Court also has yet to address school segre-
gation on the basis of sexual orientation, although lower courts have
addressed segregation on this basis in the context of the armed
forces.'" Finally, each classification—race, gender, and sexual orienta-
tion—requires a different level of scrutiny in equal protection analy-
sis. 13 ' The level of scrutiny also depends, in part, on whether there is
discriminatory intent or only discriminatory impact itwolvec1.132 Ex-
amining cases from these different contexts provides a background
for analyzing this new public education equal protection problem.'"
A. The Push Towards Integration in Public Education
1. Integration and Race: Separate but Equal Can Never Be Equal
In 1954, in the seminal case of Brown v. Board of Education, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that separate but equal on the basis of race is in-
herently unequal in public education. 134 Many scholars agree that
Brown inspired the civil rights movement and continues to be the
Court's definitive statement on the meaning of equal protection.'"
Brown is also an example of anti-subordination and formal equality
working in tandem to achieve equal opportunity in public education
"9 See VAIL 518 U.S. at 533-34; Cooper, 358 U.S. at 16; Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. The Bush
Administration's No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 indicates that single-sex public educa-
tion is acceptable as long as equivalent classrooms and facilities are available. See 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 7215(a) (23) (West 2003). Advocates disagree, however, about whether this is constitu-
tional. Compare Erin C. Logsdon, No Child Left Behind" and the Promotion of Single-Sex Public
Education in Primary and Secondary Schools: Shattering the Glass Ceilings Perpetuated by Coeduca-
tion, 32 J.L. & Enuc.. 291, 295-96 (2003) (arguing for constitutionality), with James M. Sulli-
van, Note, The Single-Sex Education Choice Facing School Districts After the No Child Left Behind Act
of 2001 Is Not the One That Congress Intended, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & Pol.'v 381, 412
(2003) (questioning constitutionality).
159 Sec Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 636 (2d Cir. 1998). For descriptions of the
discrimination (not segregation) facing LGBTQ students in schools, see Dennis & Harlow,
supra note 22, at 448-53, and Eric Roles, Opening Up the CiliSSMOM Closet: Responding to the
Educational Needs of Gay and Lesbian Youth, 59 Ilmtv. EDUC. REV. 444, 444-45 (1989).
151 See VAIL 518 U.S. at 533 (requiring heightened or intermediate scrutiny for gen-
der); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996) (requiring apparent rational basis scru-
tiny for sexual orientation); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(requiring strict scrutiny for race).
152 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (explaining that discriminatory
impact alone does not trigger heightened scrutiny).
155 See MI, 518 U.S. at 533-34; cooper, 358 U.S. at 16; Brown, 347 U.S. at 495; Able, 155
F.3d at 636.
347 U.S. at 495.
135 See Cummings, supra note 18, at 725; Ford, supra note 89, at 1330-31.
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for all students, at least with respect to access." 6 The case thus demon-
strates the power of a decision that unites both the anti-subordination
and formal equality theories."7
In Brown, black students filed a number of class action lawsuits
against local school districts." 8
 The plaintiffs sought admission to lo-
cal schools which excluded them based on race) 99
 The Court unani-
mously held that racial segregation in public schools denied equal
opportunity for the excluded children, regardless of whether there
were substantially equivalent educational facilities available,"°
The decision in Brown emphasized the fundamental importance
of education) ." More importantly, though, the decision focused on
the negative effects of segregation."2
 The Court rejected the theory
presented in Rosy v. Ferguson that the badge of inferiority blacks per-
ceived in segregation was merely a construction invented by blacks." 3
Rather, the Court recognized segregation's stigma, explaining that seg-
regating black students "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone."144
 State-mandated segregation therefore
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee." 5
Brown is not only influential precedent, but it is also an example
of anti-subordination and formal equality working together."° Requir-
ing school districts to admit blacks supported anti-subordination be-
cause the Court demanded that the state no longer use segregation as
136
 SCCNCIllkO, supra note 3, at 50-51.
137 See id.
ma 347 U.S. at 486.
139 Id. at 487.
140
 Id, at 493.
141
 Id. at 493-94. The Court, however, did not acknowledge education as a fundamen-
tal right under the U.S. Constitution; it only claimed that when a state sought to provide
public education it must do so on an equal basis. See id.; see also San Antonio hidep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (noting that education is not a fundamental right
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution).
142 See Thom, 347 U.S. at 493-95.
143
 Id. at 494-95; Messy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
144 Mown, 347 U.S. at 494. The Court used social science research to support its claims,
in particular, the work of Dr. Kenneth Clark. Id. at 494 n.11; see also supra note 116 and
accompanying text.
146
 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. The Court in Brawn evaluated the case on the basis of strict
scrutiny, which requires that the state may discriminate on the basis of race only if the
discrimination is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. Ada-
rand, 515 U.S. at 227; see Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-95.
148 Nemko, supra note 3, at 50-51; see 347 U.S. at 492-95.
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a tool of racial oppression. 147 The Court thus sought to ensure the
equal protection of members of this disadvantaged classification. 148 At
the same time, it served formal equality because the state was re-
quired to treat blacks and whites alike by teaching students together
in the same schools. 149 The Court thus sought to ensure, at least in
theory, that members of different classifications received the same
education from the state,'" In principle, Brown arguably stands for a
color blind ideal, though one which considers social context in achiev-
ing that objective.m At the time Brown was decided, it was thus impos-
sible in practice to separate anti-subordination and formal equality.'"
The Court, in 1958, expanded Brown when it decided Cooper v.
Aaron, which held that private bias, and even preservation of law and
order, were not justifications for preventing constitutionally mandated
integration. 193 This case was a response to the actions of Arkansas
government officials, notably the Governor of Arkansas, Orval
F'aubus, who ordered the state National Guard to prevent nine stu-
dents from attending the newly integrated Central High School in
Little Rock,' 54 The students were not admitted until several weeks
later when President Eisenhower ordered federal troops to enforce
integration,'" Federal National Guardsmen soon replaced the troops
and remained at Central High for the rest of the school year.'"
Several months later, the school board and the superintendent
filed a petition with the district court to postpone desegregation. 157
The state argued that public hostility to the presence of black chil-
dren in schools with white children made it impossible to educate its
students competently.' 58 The diStrict court found, and the U.S. Su-
preme Court acknowledged, a situation of extreme tension and tur-
moil, including incidents of violence towards the students.'" Yet the
Court held that the state could not preserve law and order by denying
147 Nemko, supra note 3, at 50-51; see Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-95.
143 Nemko, supra note 3, at 50-51; see Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-95.
149 Nemko, supra note 3, at 50-51; sec Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-95.
1" See Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-95; Nemko, supra note 3, at 50-51.
151 See 347 U.S. at 492-95; Nemko, supra note 3, at 50-51.
152 See 347 U.S. at 492-95; Nentko, supra note 3, at 50-51.
155 See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 16.
154 Id. at 7-12.
155 Id. at 12.
158
157 Id,
158 Cooper 358 U.S. at 12.
159 Id, at 13, 15.
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black students their constitutional rights. 160
 The Court implicated the
state in contributing to the intolerable situation in the schoolm More
fundamentally, though, the Court maintained that disagreement with
constitutional principles is not reason enough to let those principles
yield. 162
 For the Court, equal protection principles trumped hostility
and even violence.m
2. Integration and Gender: No More Perpetuation of the Legal,
Social, and Economic Inferiority of Women
Although not as far-reaching as the history of racial discrimina-
tion, the history of gender discrimination in public education is
significant.'" In 1996, in United States v. Virginia (17M/), the U.S. Su-
preme Court decided an important equal protection case with regard
to gender discrimination in public education when it held that Vir-
ginia must admit women to a prestigious, all-male, public military
academy. 165
 In this case, a woman sought admittance to the Virginia
Military Institute ("VMI"). 166
 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals of-
fered the state three choices: admit women to VMI, create parallel
programs or institutions, or give up state financial support and be-
come a private institution that can discriminate at wi11. 167
 Virginia
chose to create a separate program for women, the Virginia Women's
Institute of Leadership ("VWIL") . 168
 VWIL was not only academically
inferior but was premised on a cooperative educational method en-
tirely distinct from the adversarial military model utilized at VMI. 1 °9
Overturning the lower courts, the U.S. Supreme Court found a
denial of equal protection because VWIL was an inadequate substitute
for VMI. 17° It remains an open question whether the Court would
166 Id. at 16.
161
 Id. at 15.
162 Id. at 6,16.
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 6,16,19-20.
164 Sec Nemko, supra note 3, at 68-72.
165
 VAIL 518 U.S. at 534. Gender is subject to heightened or intermediate scrutiny
upon equal protection review, meaning that the state must provide an exceedingly persua-
sive justification for discriminating on the basis of gender that is substantially related to the
achievement of important governmental objectives. See id. at 533.
166 Id. at 523.
162 Id. at 525-26. As a private institution, V1111 would have had the freedom to dis-
0'1E11kt:tie based on gender free from the constitutional equal protection limitations that
apply to state actors. See id.
166 Id. at 526-28.
166 Id.
VAII, 518 U.S. at 534.
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have approved a separate but truly equal institution for women. 171 Yet.
the Court clarified that states may no longer use gender classifications
"to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of
women," though they may use them to compensate women for past
discrimination. 172 This language suggests that courts may consider
anti-subordination in equal protection problems involving gender. 173
The Court in VMI thus arguably accomplished a similar feat as it
did in Brow/1. 174 It ordered the admission of women to an elite male
institution, overcoming a form of gender oppression. 175 It also de-
manded that women and men have equal access to educational oppor-
tunities."6 As in Brown, the Court employed both anti-subordination
and formal equality together in a public education equal protection
problem. 177
B. The Push for Exclusion Based on Sexual Orientation in the Military
Unlike race or gender, there is no similarly explicit history of ex-
clusion from public education with respect to sexual orientation. 178
Sexual orientation is a classification that can apply to people from any
race and either gender. 179 It is a trait that others may not know about,
so it does not automatically present itself as a reason to treat someone
differently.'" Members of this classification, however, are sometimes
excluded from participation in another public institution—the lnili-
tary.isi The government's "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding ho-
mosexuality requires that the government not ask applicants to the
armed forces about their sexual orientation. 182 Although sexual orien-
tation itself cannot be a basis for rejection, homosexual acts and
statements indicating a propensity to engage in homosexual acts may
be bases for disqualification.'" In 10 U.S.C. § 654, Congress describes
171 Sec id. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg focused on the fact that MIL did not provide
equal opportunity—not that it could not provide equal opportunity. See id.
172 See id. at 533-34.
172 Morgan, supra note 66, at 415-17; sec I'M!, 518 U.S. at 533-34.
174 See I'M/, 518 U.S. at 533-34; Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-95.
175 I'M!, 518 U.S. at 533-34; see Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-95.
178 VIM 518 U.S. at 533-34; see Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-95.
' 77 See KM 518 U.S. at 533-34; Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-95.
178 Sec supra note 130 and accompanying text.
1" See Kelli Kristine Armstrong, The Silent Minority Within a Minority: Focusing on the
Needs of Gay Muth in Our PH bile Schools, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV, 67,70-71 (1994).
le° Sec id.
181 Sec 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000); Able, 155 F.3d at 636.
HQ STONE CT AL., supra note 116, at 652.
183 Sec 10 S.C. § 654(b); STONE ET AL., supra note 116, at 652.
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the policy within the armed forces as preserving the "high standards
of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the
essence of military capability ” 184 The statute also describes the bases
for expelling LGBTQ service members who violate this policy. 185
In 1998, in Able v. United States, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals upheld the military's policy towards LGBTQ service members
against an equal protection challenge. 186 In preserving the right of
the military to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, the
court held that the military's desire to maintain unit cohesion, pri-
vacy, and the reduction of sexual tensions justified excluding homo-
sexuals from this setting. 187 Essentially; the court held that bias against
LGBTQ service members justified excluding them because the special
nature of the military setting requires the subordination of personal
interests to the needs of the service. 188 Because negative feelings to-
wards homosexual service members could disrupt unit cohesion, the
military's discrimination against LGBTQ service members is permissi-
ble.' 89 The court of appeals thus rejected the U.S Supreme Court's
reasoning in Cooper as applied in this particular context—bias may be
a reason to exclude LGBTQ men and women from the military, even
if it is not a reason to exclude blacks from public schools. 19°
um 10 U.S.C. § 654(a) (14).
' 85 Id. § 654(b).
186 155 F.3d at 636. The court decided the case using rational basis review, which re-
quires only that the government's discrimination bear a rational relationship to a legiti-
mate government interest. Id. at 632. The court decided this case tinder the equal protec-
tion component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is the federal
equivalent of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to
states. See id. at 630; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,498-500
(1954) (invalidating public school segregation in the District of Columbia on the basis of
the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
187 Able, 155 F.3d at 635-36 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 654).
188 Id. at 632.
186 Id. at 632-36.
190 Compare Cooper 358 U.S. at 16 (refusing to permit discrimination), with Able, 155 F.3d
at 632-36 (permitting discrimination based on sexual orientation). It is important to note
that the military once argued that it was necessary to exclude blacks from military service in
order to achieve unit cohesion. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights. Civil
Rights, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1467,1485-88 (2000) (comparing the military's justifications for
excluding potential service members on the bases of sexual orientation and race).
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C. Scrutiny: How Closely Will Courts EValuate an Equal Protection. Claim?
1. Sexual Orientation: Don't Ask, Don't Tell What. Level of Scrutiny
Applies
Although the Able court used rational basis scrutiny to evaluate an
equal protection problem regarding sexual orientation, it is unclear
where the U.S. Supreme Court stands today on the level of scrutiny
that applies to this classification.' 91 In two relatively recent cases, Ro-
mer v. Evans, in 1996, and Lawrence v. Texas, in 2003, the. Court sug-
gested a move towards applying a heightened level of scrutiny when
sexual orientation is a basis for discrimination.' 92 It is generally
difficult to defeat legislation using deferential rational basis review.'"
Yet in Romer and Lawrence, the Court invalidated legislation discrimi-
nating on the basis of sexual orientation without claiming it used any-
thing more than rational basis analysis.'"
In Romer; the Court refused to uphold an amendment to the
Colorado state constitution that attempted to remove the possibility of
protected status based on sexual orientation in Colorado law. 195 The
Court found that the amendment was so far reaching, yet so narrowly
targeted towards a particular class of persons, that it was unexplain
able on the basis of anything other than animus. 196 Scholars disagree
about whether the Court applied rational basis scrutiny or something
more when it decided Rome-1: 197
In Lawrence, the Court struck down a law prohibiting homosex-
ual, but not heterosexual, sodomy on substantive due process
grounds, thus overruling its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, which
would have sustained such a law. 198 Although the Court decided Law-
191 See Ramo; 517 U.S. at 632; Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 872 11.5 (Vt. 1999). In 1999,
in Baker v. State, justice Jeffrey Amestoy of the Vermont Supreme Court discussed the U.S.
Supreme C•urt's unacknowledged divergence from traditional rational basis scrutiny in
cases including Romer, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
and United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973). Baker; 744
A.2d at 872 11.5 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Forcroord: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 59-64 (1996)).
192 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574-77 (2003); Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32.
193 Sec Baker, 744 A.2d at 872 n.5; see also New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S.
568, 594 (1979) (illustrating traditional rational basis review).
1 B4 Sec Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32.
195 517 U.S. at 635.
196
 Id. at 632.
197 STONE: FIT AL., supra note 116, at 653-54; see Baker, 744 A.2d at 87211.5.
199 Launrnee, 539 U.S. at 578; sec U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 196 (1986):
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retro under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
rather titan the Equal Protection Clause, it appears possible that the
Court was more disposed to invalidate the law because it discrimi-
nated based on sexual orientation. 199
The U.S. Supreme Court has departed from traditional rational
basis review before without committing to a higher level of scrutiny. 200
But in the case of gender, the Court actually applied heightened scru-
tiny before it admitted to abandoning rational basis review with re-
spect to the classification."' Titus, it is currently unclear whether the
Court is moving away from traditional rational basis review in general
or moving towards establishing a higher level of scrutiny in equal pro-
tection problems involving sexual orientation, as it did with gender. 202
2. The Importance of the Intent to Discriminate: Discriminatory
Impact Is Unlikely to Be Enough
In determining what level of scrutiny applies in an equal protec-
tion problem, courts must consider another factor in addition to the
classification in question—intent to discriminate or lack thereof. 203
The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated that discriminatory intent is
required to trigger strict or heightened scrutiny in equal protection
cases."' Courts will evaluate equal protection claims involving only dis-
criminatory impact under rational basis scrutiny, 205
 Cases lacking dis-
criminatory intent thus are unlikely to constitute equal protection viola-
tions because rational basis scrutiny is generally quite deferential to the
199
 Sec Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (discussing the link between equal protection and due
process with respect to discrimination). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor would have decided
the case on equal protection grounds. Id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing dis-
crimination); see also Goodridge r. Dept of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948-49, 953, 959
(Mass. 2003) (citing Lawrence as support in declaring the Massachusetts ban on same-sex
marriage unconstitutional on state constitutional grounds).
299
 Sce Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450; Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
291
 •IDNE ET AL., supra note 116, at 653-54. Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976) (articulating that statute that discriminates on basis of gender "must serve impor-
tant governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives" to survive equal protection challenge), with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76
(1971) (striking down statute that discriminated on basis of gender because statute bore
no "rational relationship" to state objective advanced by statute).
202
 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-77; Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32; •IONE ET AL., supra 110 ie
116, at 653-54.
203
 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
204
 See Personnel Achn'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279-80 (1979); Davis, 426 at 242.
205
 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279-80; Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
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government. 206 Therefore, absent discriminatory intent, it is difficult to
bring a successful challenge under the Equal Protection Clause.2°7
In 1976, in Washington v. Davis, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
a qualifying test given to police applicants in the District of Columbia
did not violate equal protection even though it had a disproportion-
ate impact on black applicants. 208 The Court explained that a law's
discriminatory impact may indicate invidious discrimination in cer-
tain cases, such as when a facially neutral law is applied in a clearly
discriminatory manner, but that disproportionate impact alone is not
enough to trigger strict scrutiny. 209
The Court cited the 1886 case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins as an example
of a case in which a facially neutral law applied in a discriminatory
fashion may violate equal protection. 210 In Vick Wo, the Court found
an equal protection violation when government officials applied a fa-
cially neutral building regulation selectively to Chinese-American cid-
zens.2" The Court found no parallel in Davis, in which the results of a
test, rather than the conscious application of a law, produced the dis-
criminatory impact. 212 Thus, government action that has a dispropor-
tionate impact based on a classification may need to survive only ra-
tional basis review. 215 Absent intentional discrimination, strict scrutiny
does not apply and courts are unlikely to find an equal protection vio-
lation. 214 The presence or absence of discriminatory intent thus may
have a significant influence on the outcome of an equal protection
problem. 215
2°6 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279-80; Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
207 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279-80; Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
208 426 U.S. at 245-46.
209 Id. at 241-42.
210 Id. at 241 (citing Nick Wo v. Hopkins. 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886)).
211
	 U.S. at 374.
212 See 426 U.S. at 245-46.
2"S
	 id. at 242; see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (describing the
intent requirement in disproportionate impact case regarding the death penalty).
214 See McCloskey, 481 U.S. at 292; Davis, 426 U.S. at 242; sec also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279-
80 (extending the doctrine to gender).
216 See McCloskey, 481 U.S. at 292; Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279-80; Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
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III. ANALYSIS: ANTI-SUBORDINATION MUST BE REUNITED WITH
FORMAL EQUALITY TO ACHIEVE TRUE EQUAL PROTECTION
Two important questions present themselves in evaluating HMHS
from an equal protection perspective. 216 First, is HMI-IS constim-
tional? 217
 Second, is I-IMHS the best solution to the problems LGBTQ
youths face in public schools?218
Although HMHS is likely constitutional, it is not the best strategy
for pursuing equal protection, particularly over time. 219
 I-IMHS priori-
tizes anti-subordination over formal equality, addressing the immedi-
ate needs of at-risk youth rather than permitting them to face harass-
ment at their current public schools. 22° Voluntary school segregation,
however, is unlike affirmative action, which also prioritizes anti-sub-
ordination over formal equality, because voluntary segregation in-
creases the danger of entrenching classifications. 221
 Regardless of its
motive, voluntary school segregation sends the negative message that
hostility justifies segregation. 222
 This message absolves public schools
of their duty to solve the discrimination problem, allowing it to con-
tinue. 223 Voluntary segregation also creates stigma. 224 The message
and results of voluntary segregation are thus the same as involuntary
segregation in terms of the effect on society as a whole. 22° From this
perspective, voluntary school segregation does not appear dramati-
cally different from the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy. 226
In order to address discrimination against LGBTQ students but
avoid the negative implications of segregation, society must reunite
anti-subordination and formal equality by insisting that integrated
216 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996) (1M); Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Able v. United
States, 155 F.3d 628, 636 (2ti Cir. 1998).
217 See Mil, 518 U.S. at 533-34; Cooper, 358 U.S. at 16; Brown, 347 U.S. at 495; Able, 155
F.3d at 636.
218 See VttfI, 518 U.S. at 533-34; Cooper, 358 U.S. at 16; Brawn, 347 U.S. at 495; Able, 155
F.3d at 636.
219 See infra notes 231 -321 and accompanying text; see also Dennis & Harlow, supra note
22, at 453-56 (discussing and criticizing the original Harvey Milk program); Ford, supra
note 89, at 1320.
229 Sec infra notes 250-274 and accompanying text; see also Morgan, supra note 66, at
458-60; Neinko, supra note 3, at 76-77.
221 See infra notes 250-274 and accompanying text.
222 See infra notes 275-295 and accompanying text.
2" Sec infra notes 275-295 and accompanying text.
221 See infra notes 296-301 and accompanying text.
225
 See infra notes 275-321 and accompanying text.
225 See infra notes 302-321 and accompanying text.
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schools overcome discrimination from within.227 This approach best
encompasses the Fourteenth Amendment's dual ideals of treating
people alike and providing equal protection for disadvantaged indi-
viduals.229 Society must maintain that hostility is never a sufficient rea-
son for segregation and demand that integrated schools become safe
and supportive enough to meet the needs of LGBTQ students. 229 This
unifying approach will ensure that schools address real student needs
while assisting the transformation towards a society in which
classifications no longer matter. 230
A. The Harvey Milk High School Should Survive a Constitutional Challenge
HMHS would probably survive an equal protection challenge be-
cause the school's admissions policy lacks discriminatory intent based
on sexual orientation. 23 I The policy does not discriminate on this ba-
sis, but rather targets students who are in crisis. 232 Although the pro-
gram is aimed towards LGBTQ students, heterosexual students are
welcome to apply and to be considered for achnission. 233 HMHS sim-
ply seeks to provide a safe, hate-free learning environment for at-risk
stucieiits. 234 An equal protection challenge to HMHS, claiming that
the school discriminates based on sexual orientation, probably would
fail because heterosexual students are not excluded. 235
The basis for discrimination against a potential HMHS student is
thus not sexual orientation but the extent to which that student is at
risk, for any reason.236 That the school may attract a disproportionate
number of LGBTQ students is a discriminatory impact problem re-
quiring only rational basis scrutiny. 237 Under a rational basis analysis,
227 See infra notes 322-347 and accompanying text.
223 See infra notes 322-347 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 322-347 and accompanying text.
2" Sec infra notes 322-347 and accompanying text.
231 Sec McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987); Personnel Achu'r v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 279-80 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
232 HMI, Q &A's on HAMS, supra note 22.
233 Id.
294 Id,
233 Sec IlkCleskcy, 481 U.S. at 292; Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279-80; Davis, 426 U.S. at 242; HMI,
Q & A's on HAMS, supra note 22. New York state Senator Ruben Diaz filed a lawsuit on
August 13, 2003, claiming that HMHS violates educational rules against discriminating on
the basis of sexual orientation. Gewertz, supra note 19, at 7; Associated Press, Lawsuit Chal-
lenges Gay High School, at http://www.cmi.com/2003/EDUCATION/08/14/g-ay.school.ap/ht-
dex.html (Aug. 20, 2003).
236 Sec HMI, QC A's on HAWS, SlfPra note 22.
297 Sec McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292; Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279-80; Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
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it appears that prioritizing admittance for at-risk youth bears a ra-
tional relationship to the legitimate state interest in providing safe
educational opportunities for all students. 238 Thus, HMHS is unlikely
to violate equal protection. 239
Even if a court found that HMHS discriminates based on sexual
orientation, the school is still likely to survive a constitutional chal-
lenge.240 Under this scenario, it is possible to imagine a court finding
that HMHS's facially neutral policy is - applied in a discriminatory
manner, systematically excluding heterosexual students. 241 Like in Pick
Wo v. Hopkins, in which a facially neutral building ordinance was ap-
plied selectively to Chinese-Americans, this kind of activity may trigger
a higher level of scrutiny than mere rational basis. 242 In this case, the
higher level of scrutiny available for discrimination based on sexual
orientation would be something more than rational basis, which the
U.S. Supreme Court has potentially applied but not officially ac-
knowledged. 243 And even if a court applied this slightly higher stan-
dard, discriminating based on sexual orientation in admissions ap-
pears to be rationally related to the legitimate state interest in
providing safe educational opportunities to members of a disadvan-
taged group. 244
Scrutiny has an ironic result in affirmative action-type situa-
tions—the higher the applicable standard of review, the more difficult
it is to survive a constitutional challenge. 245 Thus, in affirmative action
programs, it is easier to discriminate based on gender than based on
race, even though race is supposed to warrant more protection as a
classification, because gender's lower level of scrutiny results in
greater flexibility for government action. 248 This is an example of
strict formal equality's unreasonable results—without consideration of
context, as anti-subordination requires, the group needing the most
256 See AleCteskey, 481 U.S. at 292; Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279-80; Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
259 Sec McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292; Feency, 442 U.S. at 279-80; Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
240 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (applying something more than ra-
tional basis scrutiny in the context of sexual orientation). Although the U.S. Supreme
Court, in Romer v. Evans, invalidated the government action in question, it did so because
the action was motivated by animus. unlike HMHS. See 517 U.S. at 632.
241 Sec Davis, 426 U.S. at 241; lick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,374 (1886).
242 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 241; rick Wu, 118 U.S. at 374.
243 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574-77 (2003); Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32.
244 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32 (invalidating state constitutional amendment on the
basis of animus, which is not present ut HMHS).
245 Sec Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); Nemko, supra note 3, at 40.
246 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247 (Stevens,]., dissenting); Nemko, supra note 3, at 40.
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protection gets the least protection. 247 In seeking to assist members of
a classification that is granted less protection by courts, however, this
strange outcome can be helpful. 248 Because sexual orientation de-
mands an even lower level of scrutiny than gender, HMHS, an
affirmative action-type program, should be held constitutional. 249
B. The Harvey Milk High School Is Not the Best Solution to the Problem of
Discrimination. Against LGBTQ Students
I, Voluntary School Segregation Is Unlike Affirmative Action Because
It Increases the Danger of Entrenching Classifications
Affirmative action and voluntary school segregation both priori-
tize anti-subordination over formal equality."° Affirmative action,
however, does so in the context of integration, while voluntary school
segregation clearly does not. 251 This crucial distinction enables
affirmative action to temper the danger of entrenching classifications,
while voluntary school segregation exacerbates it. 252 These two ap-
proaches, then, are not equally viable anti-subordination options. 03
HMHS calls for anti-subordination in the context of voluntary
school segregation. 254 Although such programs can be considered
remedial or compensatory—like affirmative action—they present
dangers that are missing in traditional affirmative action. 2" Advo-
cates prioritize anti-subordination over formal equality in traditional
affirmative action, treating members of different groups differently
in order to promote substantive equal treatment, 25° But affirmative
action in public education results in a diverse mix of members of clif-
241 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Nemko, supra note 3, at 40.
248 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Nemko, supra note 3, at 40.
249 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Nemko, supra note 3, at 40.
255 Compare Cummings, supra note 18, at 725-27, and Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71
(discussing the negative impact of segregation), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
329-33 (2003) (discussing the positive impact of affirmative action).
261 Sec Gruner; 539 U.S. at 329-33; Cummings, supra note 18, at 725-27; Vodjik, supra
note 71, at 70-71.
262 See Gruner, 539 U.S. at 329-33; Cummings, supra note 18, at 725-27; Vodjik, supra
note 71, at 70-71.
255 See Grittier, 539 U.S. at 329-33; Cummings, supra note 18, at 725-27; Vodjik, supra
note 71, at 70-71.
254 Sec Morgan, supra note 66, at 458-60; Nemko, supra note 3, at 76-77; Smith, supra
note 3, at 2054-55.
256 See supra notes 250-253 and accompanying text.
255 See Nemko, supra note 3, at 33-35.
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fereut classifications learning together. 257
 It thus creates, through
anti-subordination, a world that looks like the ideal world in which
affirmative action would no longer be necessary.258 This encourages
society to see the world not in black and white, female and male, but
as a world in which people appear side by side. 259
 It entrenches this
diversity as normal. 26°
Affirmative action is thus aspirational because it works to create a
world that would make the practice itself irrelevant.261
 Eventually, if
affirmative action works, anti-subordination would no longer be neces-
sary because members of groups would not be treated differently
based on their group membership. 262
 Formal equality—treating peoL
pie alike—would then become all that is necessary to achieve true
equality of opportunity. 263
 The societal dangers of prioritizing anti-sub-
ordination over formal equality are therefore tempered by the integra-
tion that results from using affirmative action in public education. 264
Voluntary school segregation, in contrast, encourages society to
view the world according to classifications. 265
 Advocates prioritize
anti-subordination over formal equality in this scenario, treating stu-
dents differently in order to provide them substantively equal educa-
tional opportunities. 266
 Unlike traditional affirmative action, however,
voluntary school segregation physically separates members of differ-
ent classifications. 267
 These classifications thus become sharper and
more clearly defined—they become entrenched, and separating
members of classifications from one another becomes normal. 268
Anti-subordination in this context does not promote a society in
which classifications no longer matter because it further emphasizes
these classifications.269
 It then becomes more likely that these
257
 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329-33.
258 See id.
258 See id.
260 See Nemko, supra note 3, at 19 (quoting LIVA BAKER, I'M RAncLIFFE! FLY MEI THE
SEVEN SISTERS AND THE FAILURE OF WOMEN'S EDUCATION 15 (1976) (suggesting that the
ultimate goal of women's colleges was to achieve gender equality to put themselves out of
business)). Affirmative action, another measure supporting anti-subordination, appears to




254 Sec Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329-33.
285 See Ford, supra note 89, at 1319; Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71.
288 Sec Morgan, supra note 66, at 458-60; Nemko, supra note 3, at 76-77.
287 See Cummings, supra note 18, at 725-26; Vodjik, supra note 71, at 83-84.
268
 See Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71,83-84.
269 See Ford, supra note 89, at 1308; Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71,83-84.
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classifications will be used as justifications for treating people differ-
ently. 27° The societal dangers of prioritizing anti-subordination over
formal equality are therefore exacerbated in the context of voluntary
school segregation. 271
It is difficult to imagine how voluntary school segregation could
ever result in a world in which classifications are irrelevant and formal
equality is all that is necessary to achieve equality of opportunity. 272
Under this approach, the ideal will be forever out of reach. 273 Volun-
tary school segregation's societal cost is thus too high a price to pay,
despite its immediate benefits. 274
2. Hostility Should Never Justify Segregation: Voluntary or Involuntary,
the Negative Message and Negative Effects on Schools and Society
Are the Same
a. Allowing Segregation Sends a Negative Message with a Negative Effect on
Schools: Hostilitylustifies Segregation
Segregation in public education is unacceptable because the re-
sulting message is the same regardless of whether the motive is anti-sub-
ordination or oppression, or whether the segregation is voluntary or
involuntary—hostility towards a group justifies segregation. 275 This
practice thus amounts to tolerating discrimination because it. solves
the problem by removing the targeted students rather than demand-
ing that the discrimination stop. 27° In order to avoid endorsing this
negative message that absolves public schools of their responsibility to
fix the problem, society should embrace the idea that hostility is never
reason enough to justify segregation in public schools. 277
The case for HMHS is strong. 278 The statistics on discrimination
against. LGBTQ youths paint a disturbing picture of harassment and
2" Sec MACKINNON, 5111/777 note 74, at 8-9; Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71; sec also Ford,
supra note 89, at 1328-30 (arguing that 1IA1HS encourages society to view differences be-
tween groups as intrinsic rather than as socially created).
271 See Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71; see also Sharon E. Rush, Lessons from and for "Dis-
abled" Students, 81 GENI/ER RACE & JUST. 75,86 (2004).




	 Cooper, 358 U.S. at 16; Ford, supra note 89, at 1332.
276 See MACKINNON, supra note 74, at 8-9; Dennis & Harlow, supra note 22, at 456.
277 See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 16; NIAcKINNoN, supra note 74, at 8-9; Cununings. supra note
18, at 725-27; Dennis & Harlow, supra note 22, at 456; Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71.
272 See HMI, LGBTQ Youth Statistics, supra note 25.
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academic failure. 279 Yet hostility against these students should not jus-
tify segregating them. 28° In Cooper v. Aaron, the U.S. Supreme Court
found that even violence against black students could not justify seg-
regation; the public schools were required to fix the problem rather
than avoid it. 281 Advocates should adopt this theory in fighting dis-
crimination against LGBTQ students as well. 282
HMHS admittedly can be distinguished from the circumstances in
Cooper on two grounds.283 First, the motive behind voluntary segrega-
tion is positive.284 Anti-subordination advocates, not opponents of
LGBTQ interests, are behind the development of the schoo1. 285 This
justification is unlike the post hoc rationalization displayed by the Ar-
kansas school system in Cooper; in which government officials attempted
to cloak racist motives in false concern for the students in question. 288
Furthermore, the segregation at issue is voluntary. 287 The state is not.
mandating it, only tolerating it; no student will be forced to attend. 288
The resulting message, however, remains the same in either cir-
cumstance. 289 Hostility against LGBTQ students justifies segregating
them. 29° Society therefore avoids dealing with the root of the prob-
lem, allowing discrimination to continue in public schools despite
good intentions to the contrary. 291 This message, therefore, is not
mere ideology—it has a concrete, negative result. 292 Even if society
simultaneously works to overcome discrimination within integrated
schools, as advocated by the Hetrick-Martin Institute (which helps to
run HMHS), it is clear that removal itself functions as the immediate
solution.293 It is unclear, however, how students and teachers who ex-
acerbate the problem will truly learn to overcome bias when the tar-
279 See id.
280
 Dennis & Harlow, supra note 22, at 456; see Cooper, 358 U.S. at 6, 16, 19-20.
"1 Sec 358 U.S. at 6, 16.
28= See id.; Dennis & Harlow, supra note 22, at 456.
283 Compare 358 U.S. at 7-12 (describing the facts of the case), with HMI, About HMI &
HMHS, supra note 19 (describing the impetus for HMHS).
2e4 See HMI, About HAIL & HMIS, supra note 19.
288 Sec id.
288 Compare Cooper 358 U.S. at 15-17 (describing the government's role in creating the
problem), with HMI, .About HMI C.? HMHS, supra note 19 (describing HMI's goals in creat-
ing HMHS).
287 HMI, Q &A's on HMHS, supra note 22.
288 hi.
289 Sec Cooper, 358 U.S. at 6, 16, 19-20; Ford, supra note 89, at 1332.
29° Sec Cooper, 358 U.S. at 6, 16, 19-20; HMI, About HMI eg HMHS, supra note 19.
291 Sec MAcKINNotv , supra note 74, at 8-9; Dennis & Harlow, supra note 22, at 456.
202 See MAcKtrmoN, supra note 74, at 8-9; Dennis & Harlow, supra note 22, at 456.
293 See HN11, Q &A's on HMHS, supra note 22.
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gets of bias are removed. 291 Supporting voluntary segregation thus
endorses the message that hostility justifies segregation, a message
that frees public schools front taking their duty to overcome discrimi-
nation against LGBTQ students seriously. 295
b. Segregation's Negative Effects on Society Remain the Same Whether Segrega-
tion Is Voluntary or Invotitulary
In addition to permitting discrimination in public schools to con-
tinue, voluntary school segregation also invites the negative effects on
society that follow from prioritizing anti-subordination over formal
equality in the context of segregation—entrenching classifications
and creating stigma. 296 First, prioritizing anti-subordination over for-
mal equality in the context of segregation creates a likelihood of en-
trenching classifications.297 Second, voluntary school segregation may
actually create stigma as well. 298 It appears possible that at least some
students would feel stigmatized by attending a school like HMHS.299 A
gay 18-year-old high school graduate who faced harassment in his
public school said about HMHS, "It's just segregation. That's not the
solution. It says we are marginalized, and that's not fair." 39° Although
other students emphasize that HMHS provided their only opportunity
to graduate from school safely, the reaction of LGBTQ students who
oppose HMHS indicates that society must take the possible harm of
stigma seriously.391
294 See MACKINNON, supra note 74, at 8-9; Dennis & Harlow, supra note 22, at 456; see
also Editorial, The Harvey Milk High School, N.Y. TmtEs, Aug. 3,2003, § 4, at 10 (stating that
segregation does not solve the problem of discrimination). Richard Thompson Ford sug-
gests that if someone is to be segregated. schools should remove the harassers, rather than
the targets. Ford, supra note 89, at 1327.
295 Sec Cooper, 358 U.S. at 16; MACKINNON, supra note 74, at 8-9; Dennis & Harlow, su-
pra note 22, at 456.
298 Sec MACKINNON, supra note 74, at 8-9; Cummings, supra note- 18, at 725-27; Dennis
& Harlow, supra note 22, at 456; Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71.
297 Sec supra notes 250-274 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between
affirmative action and voluntary school segregation).
298 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-95; Cummings, supra note 18, at 725-26, 728-33; Dennis
& Harlow, supra note 22, at 455; see also supra notes 116-122 and accompanying text.
299 See Gewertz, supra note 19, at 7.
599 See id.
701 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-95; Dennis & Harlow, supra note 22, at 455; Gewertz, su-
pra note 19, at 7.
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c. Supporting the Harvey Milk High School's Approach Is Inconsistent with
Opposing "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Because These Practices Endorse the
Same Negative Message and Have the Same Negative Effects
Allowing segregation because of bias against LGBTQ youths is
reminiscent of allowing LGBTQ exclusion from the armed forces be-
cause these two practices endorse the same negative message that hos-
tility justifies segregation." 2
 Despite the different motivations behind
these practices, the message to society remains the same, and the
negative societal effects remain the same as well." 3 It is thus inconsis-
tent to support HMHS and to oppose "don't ask, don't tell" if the
message and effects of these two practices matter." 4
The justification for the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy is
unpersuasive. 305
 In the armed forces, private bias against LGBTQ serv-
ice members outweighs the interests of those service members in mili-
tary participation. 306
 Rather than work to overcome the bias and allow
full and equal participation of all citizens, the military seeks to avoid
the problem by excluding LGBTQ service members when others react
negatively to those service members' sexual orientation. 807
 This per-
spective, endorsed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Able v.
United States, encourages society not only to see the world according to
classifications, but to treat people differently because of them.808
 This
runs counter to both of equal protection's two goals— treating people
alike and providing protection for disadvantaged individuals."°
LGBTQ advocates have criticized this divisive decision, which sa-
crifices inclusion to avoid conflict."°
Although excluding LGBTQ service members from the military
differs from voluntary school segregation in important ways, as in the
comparison with Cooper, the resulting message and effects are the
3°2 See Able, 155 F.3d at 636; Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71.
303 See Cummings, supra note 18, at 725-26; Dennis & Harlow, supra note 22, at 456;
Ford, supra note 89, at 1332; Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71.
304
 See Able, 155 F.3d at 636; Cummings, supra note 18, at 725-26; Dennis & Harlow, su-
pra note 22, at 456; Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71.
305 Compare Cooper 358 U.S. at 16 (rejecting segregation), with Able, 155 F.3d at 636 (ac-
cepting "don't ask, don't tell").
906 Able, 155 F.3d at 636.
307
 See id. at 632-36.
3°8 Sec id.
3°9
	 id.; Hutchinson, supra note 43, at 619-23; Nemko, supra note 3, at 21.
310
 See Nancy Levit, A Different Kind of Sameness: Beyond Formal Equality and Antisu borditta-
lion Strategies in Gay Legal Theory, 61 Onto ST. L.J. 867,914-16 (2000).
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same."' HMHS does not exclude LGBTQ students from school alto-
gether; it merely provides a separate educational experience, and a
voluntary one at that. 312 Additionally, the motive behind HMHS is to
advance the interests of LGBTQ students rather than to exclude
them.313 Choosing to attend HMHS rather than an integrated school
is thus clearly distinct from involuntary exclusion from the military. 314
Still, the same problem arises; hostility justifies separation in both
contexts.316 The negative effects of segregation—allowing discrimina-
tion to continue, entrenching classifications, and creating stigma—are
still present. 316 Moreover, the context of public school makes the need
for integration even more compelling. 317
The Court in Brown emphasized the fundamental importance of
education in that. landmark decision: "Today, education is perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments.... It is re-
quired in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citi-
zenship."318 Because public education is so important, and because
most American children participate in it, integration in public schools
is arguably more important than in the military, in which relatively few
people participate." 9 If voluntary school segregation became wide-
spread, the societal impact could be much broader than the impact of
"don't ask, don't tell."3" It is therefore inconsistent to oppose "don't.
ask, don't tell" but to support voluntary school segregation, because the
negative message and effects are the same in either circumstance. 321
311 Sec Cooper, 358 U.S at 16; MACKINNON, supra note 74, at 8-9; Cummings, supra note
18, at 725-26; Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71.
312 HMI, Q D'A's on HMHS, supra note 22.
313 HMI, About HMI & HMHS, supra note 19.
314 Compare Able. 155 F.3d at 636 (addressing involuntary exclusion), with HMI, About
HMI & HMHS, supra note 19 (addressing voluntary segregation).
315 See Able, 155 F.3d at 636; HMI, About HMI & HMHS, supra note 19.
310 See MACKINNON, supra note 74, at 8-9; Cummings, supra note 18, at 725-26; Vodjik,
supra note 71, at 70-71.
317 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-94; Ford, supra note 89, at 1310-11.
318 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
310 Comp= Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-94 (addressing public education), with Able, 155
F.3d at 636 (addressing the military).
320 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
521 See id. at 493-94; Able, 155 F.3d at 636; MACKINNON. supra note 74, at 8-9; Cum-
mings, supra note 18, at 725-27; Ford, supra note 89, at 1332; Vodjik, supra note 71, at 70-71.
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3. A Better Alternative: Moving Towards True Equality of Opportunity
by Reuniting Anti-subordination with Formal Equality
In Brown. v. Board of Education and United States v. Virginia (VMI),
the Supreme Court coupled anti-subordination and formal equality in
public education equal protection problems. 322
 In these cases, the
Court sought to advance the interests of disadvantaged groups (blacks
and women, respectively) by mandating that they be treated like eve-
ryone else in public school admissions. 323 At each of these moments,
these two strategies were inextricably linked.324
 This approach demon-
strates the best spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment—its dual ideals
of providing equal protection to disadvantaged individuals and treat-
ing everyone alike are both fulfilled. 323
Creating true equal educational opportunity for LGBTQ students
likewise requires reuniting anti-subordination with formal equality by
actively working to eliminate discrimination within integrated
schools. 326
 Reuniting anti-subordination with formal equality, rather
than prioritizing anti-subordination over formal equality, embraces
both of equal protection's goals of treating people alike and providing
equal protection for disadvantaged individuals. 327
 This approach pro-
vides a way to meet the immediate needs of LGBTQ students without
sacrificing society's ultimate goal—a public school system and society in
which no student will be treated differently based on classifications. 328
Simply requiring inclusion unfortunately does not always solve
the equal protection problem. 329
 The disparate educational experi-
ences some minority and female students receive today, for example,
occur in integrated schools. 33° LGBTQ students have not been sys-
tematically excluded from public schools at all; the discrimination
they face has occurred in an integrated setting."' Yet reuniting these
equal protection theories within integrated schools presents the best
approach to overcoming the problems facing LGBTQ students today
322 VMI, 518 U.S. at 533-34; Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
323
 I'M!, 518 U.S. at 533-34; Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
324 See I'M!, 518 U.S. at 533-34; Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
323 See I'M!, 518 U.S. at 533-34; Brown, 347 U.S. at 495; see also U.S. CoNsT. amend.
§ 1.
326 see VMI,, 518 U.S. at 533-34; Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
327 See I'M!, 518 U.S. at 533-34; Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
328 See MI, 518 U.S. at 533-34; Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
329 See Neptko, supra note 3, at 53-60; Smith, supra note 3, at 2041-42.
3" See Nemko, supra note 3. at 53-60; Smith, supra note 3, at 2041-42.
991 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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because it takes the needs of LGBTQ students seriously while avoiding
the pitfalls of segregation." 2
Advocates for LGBTQ youth have identified programs that assist.
LGBTQ students within integrated schools. 333 These programs may
include counseling and peer support, increasing age-appropriate in-
formation about homosexuality in the curriculum, and providing staff
development on LGBTQ issues.n4 An aggressive program within an
integrated school has the advantage of educating heterosexual stu-
dents and educators, as well as providing for the needs of LGBTQ
students, increasing the possibility of long-term success in eradicating
discrimination, and providing an equal educational opportunity. 335
Project 10, a comprehensive program that originated in the Los
Angeles Unified School District, presents a concrete alternative to the
voluntary school segregation approach that HMHS embodies."° Proj-
ect 10 combines education, school safety initiatives, dropout preven-
tion tactics, and student support services to meet the needs of
LGBTQ students within integrated public schools."? Project 10 takes
the problem of providing equal educational opportunity to LGBTQ
students seriously, embracing anti-subordination . 338 It also ensures
that all students attend school together and learn together in a setting
sensitive to LGBTQ issues, embracing formal equality." 9 This unifying
approach provides a method for achieving both of equal protection's
goals while avoiding segregation's problems. 340 LGBTQ students who
faced harassment in the past have found support and success in
schools implementing Project 10. 341 Its method has been adapted or
considered by other public schools across the country. 342 HMHS, a last
332 See VW, 518 U.S. at 533-34; BrOTIM, 347 U.S. at 495.
333 See. e.g.. Wendy Schwartz, Improving the School Experience for Gay. Lesbian and Bisexual
Students. ERIC DIGEST No. 101, Oct. 1999, at 3-4.
"4 Id.
335 See, e.g., About Project 10, at http://www.project10.org (last visited Sept. 3, 2004) (the
website for Project 10, a model for providing LGBTQ students with support in public
schools, affirming the inclusive vision of programs in integrated schools in its mission
statement).
336 Sec id.
337 Rofes, supra note 130, at 447-48 (discussing Project 10); sec generally Project 10, at
http://www.project10.org (last visited Sept. 3, 2004).
336 Sce Rofes, supra note 130, at 447-48 (describing how Project 10 meets LGBTQ stu-
dents' needs),
339 See id. at 448 (describing the mainstream context in which Project 10 operates).
345 See id. at 447-48.
3" Id. at 448.
3I2 Armstrong, supra note 179, at 87; Rofes, supra note 130, at 498.
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resort for students whose integrated schools have failed them, may
not be the last resort after all. 343
The problem is not HMHS itself, which makes a noble attempt to
meet pressing LGBTQ student needs that currently are ignored." 4
The problem is that adopting this approach in a widespread fashion
sacrifices long-term equal protection for short-term equal protec-
tion.345 Integrated education without discrimination is certainly more
diffictdt to implement and enforce and will take longer to accom-
plish."6 Ultimately the hard work is worth it, however, because stu-
dents deserve equal protection not only now, but always."'
CONCLUSION
The Harvey Milk High School utilizes anti-subordination without
formal equality in the context of voluntary school segregation. This
approach sends the negative message that hostility justifies segrega-
tion. It also allows discrimination in integrated schools to continue,
entrenches classifications, and creates stigma. Although anti-sub-
ordination is a powerful theory, it alone is not enough. Anti-sub-
ordination must be reunited with formal equality through compre-
hensive programs in integrated schools. This approach serves both
the immediate and future needs of LGBTQ students and does not
abandon the possibility that someday these students will not be
treated differently at all. In this way, American public schools can pro-
vide equal protection for at-risk students in the best spirit of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
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